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Abstract: Although Easterlin’s hypothesis of relative income has been widely supported by the majority 
of researchers that have tested it, these researchers have aimed to find a relationship between relative 
cohort size and fertility in the same time period that Easterlin examined. In this paper I argue that for 
the Easterlin hypothesis to be supported, it has to hold across nations as well as across time. The effect 
of relative cohort size on fertility is thus tested during a later time period in this paper, with the starting 
point derived from where most researchers on the topic have ended their scrutiny. Panel data for five 
industrialised nations between 1988 and 2008 have been analysed using pooled and fixed effects models. 
The pooled regressions show a clear negative effect of relative cohort size on fertility levels, and the 
mixed results from the fixed effects regressions including interactions between country and relative 
cohort size show both statistically and scientifically insignificant coefficients. The lack of support for the 
Easterlin hypothesis during this later time period indicates that the relationship between relative cohort 
size and fertility only was unique for the post-war period when the baby boom generation increasingly 
entered the labour market and fertility decreased substantially. This study discusses the possibility that a 
causal relationship has dissolved alternatively that the earlier relationship observed in fact was spurious 
due to different simultaneous processes.   
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1. Introduction 
Easterlin’s hypothesis of relative income has had a major impact on the literature of fertility 
behaviour. Not only did Easterlin challenge Becker’s neoclassical economic fertility model by 
incorporating sociology in the economic reasoning for fertility behaviour, but he also opened 
up for a model that had a possibility to predict labour market outcomes and future fertility. 
Two broad assertions come from Easterlin’s claims. The first concerns the economic 
disadvantage faced by the baby boom generation of the 1950s relative to their predecessors 
when they, as young adults, entered the labour market. Their relatively large cohort size 
doomed them to a life of harsher competition, and because they were economically 
disadvantaged in comparison to their parents’ generation, fell short of their material 
aspirations. The second assertion follows the consequences of the relative income. The 
unattained aspirations will put pressure on young adults born into large cohorts to postpone 
family formation, and thus end up with a lower fertility rate in comparison to their parents’ 
generation. Therefore, a self-generating mechanism of approximately 40 years is taking place 
where small cohorts give birth to large cohorts and vice versa (Easterlin 1980). 
The contribution to the fertility literature did, since the hypothesis’ first forerunner in 1961, 
spur a large debate with numerous scholars aiming to test the validity of Easterlin’s 
arguments. Research spread from the initial focus on the United States to include other 
industrial nations in order to test whether the hypothesis would hold across nations. Although 
less supportive outside of Europe, the majority of the research has supported Easterlin’s 
hypothesis of relative income (Macunovich 1998). However, the boom of research that arose 
with its introduction has been highly concentrated on scrutinising the same post-war period as 
Easterlin did, and alarmingly little research have been conducted on more recent time periods. 
In this paper I argue that the Easterlin hypothesis has to hold not only across nations, but also 
across time, if it is to be supported as a theory of fertility behaviour. 
With the objective to fill the apparent time gap in the literature on Easterlin’s hypothesis, I 
have conducted an exploratory comparative study of the United States, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden between the years of 1988 and 2008. The research has been 
built upon the hypothesis as specified by Easterlin but has, because of its comparison between 
countries, included renowned control variables derived from the Easterlin literature. The study 
is breaking ground within the literature revolving the Easterlin hypothesis by using tempo-
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adjusted total fertility rate as the dependent variable, thus adjusting for tempo distortions that 
are present in the more commonly used period total fertility rate measure.  
The main research question is a direct reflection of Easterlin’s first assertion;  
What effect does relative cohort size have on fertility? 
There are two contradicting hypotheses that follow in the footstep of the main research 
question; either the Easterlin hypothesis is supported and we observe a positive effect of 
relative cohort size on fertility levels, or else it is not. The main research question is followed 
by two sub-questions for deeper analysis; 
How do the results differ from the earlier time period studied by Easterlin? and 
Why, if that is the case, do we observe a difference? 
In order to answer these questions, this paper has been divided into three main parts with sub-
sections. The theoretical framework presents the Easterlin hypothesis, discusses previous 
literature, and concludes with a combination of the two that put focus on the relevant 
variables. The following part revolves around the methodology of the study. It justifies the 
choice of research design, discusses the data and present descriptive statistics to the reader 
before presenting the statistical approach of the study. The later part presents and interprets 
the results of the study, and ends with an analytical discussion of the findings.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1. The Easterlin Hypothesis  
The Easterlin hypothesis of relative income started to take shape already in the late 1950s, 
when Easterlin was studying the dramatic baby boom experience in the post-war United 
States. His research combined with unavoidable comparisons of the opportunities of his own 
generation to that of his children led him to suspect that “United States might be involved in a 
self-generating mechanism, by which low fertility in one twenty-year period led to high 
fertility in the next, and vice versa” (Easterlin 1980:ix). Based upon the above-mentioned 
suspicion, Easterlin came to argue that generation or cohort size, i.e. the number of persons 
born in a particular period, has a stronger influence of shaping lives than previously believed. 
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Expressed simply; young adults born into small cohort sizes will experience relatively good 
economic conditions, which will result in higher fertility levels in comparison to young adults 
born into large cohorts. At the core of his claim that relative cohort size affects fertility levels 
lays the change in material aspirations. A deeper explanation of the concept is thus needed 
before we return to a demonstration of Easterlin’s idea of how young couples’ fertility 
decisions are shaped during their lifetimes.  
Easterlin argued that life-style, i.e. the expectations of material standards among young 
couples, are unconsciously formed during childhood years. The material aspiration of a young 
adult is a product of the environment in which he or she grew up, which in turn was highly 
shaped by the income of the parents at the time. While other factors, such as peers, religion, or 
neighbourhood, also affect aspirations, Easterlin claimed the majority were also a product of 
the parents’ income. Material aspirations tend to rise with each generation in industrial 
countries where economic development is increasing the living standards, and luxuries for a 
parents’ generation may be perceived as necessities for their children. The minimum level of 
living standards that young couples perceive necessary for childbearing thus tend to increase 
with time, and children will be viewed as relatively less attractive than goods until the 
sufficient level of material aspirations is met. Although economic development also raises real 
income and thus makes it possible with both more children and more goods if tastes had 
remained the same, the raise in parents’ perception of necessity levels for childbearing makes 
fertility behaviour subject to relative income and the impact it has on lifestyle. The relation 
between income and aspirations for young couples make up the relative income, which 
Easterlin (1980:42) defined as; 
                
                            
                              
 
As young couples often marry within the same social class, Easterlin argued that the parents’ 
income of either the husband or the wife could approximate the average material aspirations, 
and chose to use the parents of the husband in his simplification of the definition; 
                
                                    
                                 
 
A young man’s relative income to his parents’ past income thus works as a link between 
Easterlin’s two assertions when he argued that large cohorts, in comparison to small cohorts, 
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struggle to meet their material aspirations, which leads to a lower fertility rate. In order to 
demonstrate the first assertion – how relative cohort size affects relative income, we will look 
at Easterlin’s example of a young man born into a large cohort.  
According to Easterlin, small cohorts will give birth to large cohorts and vice versa in a self-
generating cycle. A child born into a large cohort would hence grow up with parents from a 
small cohort. His parents have relatively high income in comparison to their own parents, and 
the child grows up in an environment where high material aspirations are created. Because of 
the large size of his cohort, however, he is during his entire life constantly facing competition, 
not only when it comes to attention from parents and in school when he is a child, but 
especially when he as a young adult enters the labour market. At this time of life, the effect of 
generation size are strongest felt and shape decisions of couples that are likely to have 
consequences for the rest of their life-span. Large cohorts translate into a relative surplus in 
the labour market due to the effect of birth rate on the relative number of young people 
reaching working age. Correspondingly, the effect of the labour market surplus on earnings 
and employment results in unfavourable economic life chances faced by large cohorts relative 
to small. The young man born into a large cohort thus experiences relatively high 
unemployment, has a hard time to find a job with a good wage, and struggles to advance on 
the career ladder. Although real income in relative terms has increased substantially over 
time, his income relative to his material aspirations will be low, which will affect his 
wellbeing and behaviour.  
The above demonstration of Easterlin’s first assertion opens up for possibilities to examine 
the second assertion; that relative income affects fertility levels. Easterlin empirically displays 
a general higher degree of mental stress due to failure to meet expectations. Doubt of own 
ability spurs resentment towards both others and self, and crime, suicide and political 
alienation due to psychological stress are shown to be more prevalent among young adults 
born into large cohorts than small. Failure to meet expectations tends to put strains on 
relationships as well, increasing the divorce rate and relative number of illegitimate births. A 
low relative income pressures young adults to sacrifice family formation while seeking 
opportunities to increase their economic earnings. According to Easterlin, husbands’ 
insufficient incomes of large cohorts are a strong reason for increased female labour force 
participation. This reasoning is based upon the assumption that socially constructed gender 
roles in the family remain, and that while men are faced with pressure to be good providers, 
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women are firstly judged on their accomplishments as mothers. Although the increase over 
time has been striking, Easterlin claimed that the unusual rise in young women’s labour force 
participation since the 60s is a sign of declining relative incomes as large cohorts reach young 
adulthood. Easterlin’s data shows that while the increase in female labour force participation 
is seen as a continuous phenomenon, the rapid increase in the 60s and 70s is a strong contrast 
to the almost zero growth rate two decades before. Easterlin’s explanation is that for young 
couples who are not able to live the life they want to due to low relative income levels of the 
men, one strong possibility to improve the couples’ economic situations is by increasing the 
women’s time at work away from home. Putting off childbearing or to have fewer children in 
order for the wives to return to work sooner, are consequences to these decisions. When 
Easterlin presented his hypothesis, he recognised that much had been done to change 
traditional sex-role images as well as that real signs of change were present, but used 
empirical evidence in order to show that no fundamental shifts had taken place among the 
population when it came to the roles within the family. The women remained expected to 
drop out of the labour force to care for the children to a much larger degree than men, and the 
expected jobs of men and women were still the traditional occupations and also the most 
sought after. Hence, Easterlin in his attempt to explain human behaviour argued that 
traditional family roles remained, and primarily focused on male relative income as the 
driving force of fertility.  
With young adults born into large cohorts feeling pressure to sacrifice family formation, a 
lower fertility level will be present. According to Easterlin, these factors have created self-
generating cycles of approximately 40 years. Small cohorts, due to their relatively high 
incomes, are more likely to have children at a young adult age, thus giving birth to relatively 
large cohorts. For large cohorts, the opposite is true. Although generation size is likely to 
always have had a limited impact on life outcomes, Easterlin emphasised that the importance 
of generation size has increased significantly with new conditions that arose in American 
Society since the Second World War. The federal government implemented policies that 
severely restricted immigration and maintained a growing employment level, thus altering the 
American labour supply and demand conditions which, as Easterlin argued, “resulted in a new 
relation between population and the economy” (Easterlin 1980:5).  
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2.2. Previous Literature 
The Easterlin hypothesis has been subject to heavy scrutiny since its introduction to the 
fertility discussion. The dominant figure in reviews of the large literature on the Easterlin 
hypothesis is Macunovich, who in her impressive review from 1998 critically assesses 
seventy-six published analyses of the hypothesis. As a former student of Easterlin, 
Macunovich’s words are interesting from the point of view that she, possibly more than other 
scholars, are more informed of what Easterlin was testing in his hypothesis. Her perhaps 
biased critique towards research that have failed to support the hypothesis is in fact that many 
scholars seem to have misinterpreted the main points with the hypothesis, and hence 
conducted studies that do not resemble Easterlin’s ideas. Although the support of the Easterlin 
hypothesis varies in degrees across countries, Macunovich finds an unambiguous support for 
the impact of relative income on fertility.  
 
Especially studies of the Easterlin hypothesis within North America have tended to be 
supportive. Ahlburg (1982) used data from the United States to find significant coefficients in 
sub-periods already since the 1920s, but attributed the failure of finding significant 
coefficients during the entire period since the beginning of 1900s to the change in labour 
supply due to immigration. Apart from Ahlburg, there have been several other scholars that 
have supported the Easterlin hypothesis on a macro level. Although there are studies focused 
on North American data that find unsupportive results, e.g. Rutten and Higgs’ (1984) visual 
analysis of the data used by Easterlin himself but at different time periods and scales, authors 
like Macunovich (1998) argue that they tend to draw conclusions not in favour of the 
Easterlin hypothesis by falsely representing Easterlin’s arguments.  
 
The most critical of the Easterlin hypothesis has been Ermisch, who has tested the hypothesis 
on countries outside North America five times (1979) (1980) (1982) (1983) (1988). Ermisch 
started with visual analyses the way Easterlin had, and continued with OLS regressions. He 
initially found that relative economic status could be one of many factors influencing fertility 
but rejected the hypothesis by and large both then and in later studies due to the only weak 
support by the evidence he found. Major setbacks, as Macunovich highlighted, were his 
failure to construct the relative income variable based on age-specific rates to represent the 
relationship between old and young workers’ incomes. In one study where he followed Butz 
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and Ward’s (1979) use of age-specific relative income, he did in fact provide evidence that 
relative cohort size had a significant effect on fertility of young women, but continued his 
further studies using a faulty relative income measure and unambiguously argued against the 
Easterlin hypothesis. He was also criticised for excluding important external factors, and 
when he did by including real house prices and women’s relative wages, received critique for 
their endogeneity.  Other authors testing the Easterlin hypothesis outside of North America 
have been more positive, but largely varied in their choice of methods and countries studied. 
These studies have ranged from macro-studies of socialist Eastern European countries, visual 
inspection of total fertility rates in Japan and its correlation to both relative cohort size and 
relative income, as well as an analysis based upon Israeli micro data, showing supportive 
results that nevertheless were difficult to interpret with unstable coefficients and 
multicollinearity problems (Carlson 1992)(Ohbuchi 1982)(Danziger and Neuman 1989) 
(Macunovich 1998).  
 
However, if the Easterlin hypothesis is to be revolutionary in explaining fertility behaviour, 
the hypothesis should be significant on a cross-country level. Only a relatively limited amount 
of cross-country studies have been made in comparison to single-country analyses, also here 
varying between visual inspection, OLS, and Granger Causality analytical techniques. What 
they share in common is that they all test the relationship between relative cohort size and 
fertility. When comparing their results country by country, Macunovich found similarities 
across the studies, which mostly tended to show strong supporting results for e.g. the United 
States, Australia, New Zealand and Wales, an inverse relationship for Germany, and an 
absence of a relationship for Portugal and Spain. Although comparing the studies may be 
hazardous due to the different ways their results are presented, Macunovich argue that 
countries such as Finland, Norway and the Netherlands, which in the cross-country 
comparisons have shown a possibility of a relationship or non-significant ones, can perhaps 
be placed among the countries with supporting results. Differences among the studies include 
for example Baird’s (1987) double use of relative measures by including both the age ratio 
and relative income, and O’Connell’s (1978) different indicator of cohort size picking up the 
leading and lagging differences between cohorts rather than between large and small cohorts.  
 
Pampel also stands out from the crowd by including measures of collectivism in his article 
from 1993. I especially want to highlight his study as Macunovich clearly argues that one 
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major setback of many cross-country studies is their exclusion of significant factors that can 
explain differences between countries. Pampel incorporated a number of variables in order to 
control for institutional differences in a comparison of 18 developed countries. The rationale 
behind his study was, just like Macunovich noted, that while support for the Easterlin 
hypothesis had been strong in the United States, support in European countries had proven 
weak. According to Pampel, differences in institutional structures of social protection play a 
large role in influencing relative economic status, and he argued that “societal institutions 
promoting collective responsibility for living standards and solidaristic policies of social 
protection cushion the harmful impact of large cohort size on economic well-being” (Pampel 
1993:499). In other words, he showed that countries with strong collectivist support systems 
tend to have a more limited effect of relative cohort size on fertility, as the negative economic 
situations associated with large cohort sizes and their oversupply of workers at young adult 
age may be limited due to policies that keep unemployment to a minimum and guarantee jobs. 
The knowledge of the existence of these policies may also impose a sense of security for what 
risks the future might bring, and reduce the postponement of marriage and childbearing for 
these groups. Social benefits can also contribute in providing financial security for the 
unemployed, as well as governmental subsidies aimed at certain vulnerable groups in society 
can do. Pampel argued that just as institutions of social protection can shape young adults’ 
economic status in a direct way, the institutional environment of a society could indirectly 
shape the interpretations of relative economic status. As nations vary in their degree of social 
protection, differences across countries are likely to show varying support for the Easterlin 
hypothesis as childbearing decisions among young couples in countries that are highly 
committed to social protection may be less conditioned on the relative economic status. 
Indeed, Pampel finds that countries with low levels of collectivism, such as the United States, 
have a much stronger effect of relative cohort size on fertility than countries such as Finland 
and Sweden with high collectivism. Although Pampel’s study has been highlighted as 
revolutionary in many ways, with his OLS-model results confirmed by granger causality 
analysis, his inclusion of institutional settings-variables stand out as a single rarity among 
studies of the Easterlin hypothesis.  
 
A perhaps more debated variable among the scholars of the Easterlin hypothesis is the 
controversy of including female labour force participation as a variable. As explained in the 
previous section, Easterlin’s predictions were based upon the effect of birth cohort size on 
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male relative income, excluding young women’s economic contribution due to the prevailing 
family roles in society. Already in 1976, Oppenheimer was among the first scholars to 
criticise the sole use of male relative income, and a long debate has followed since. Firstly, 
Oppenheimer criticised Easterlin for comparing relative economic status between father and 
son, while estimating the changes in their market positions over time though a general – and 
not male-specific - unemployment rate. She also noted that when Easterlin talked about 
material aspirations as derived from a comparison of own income relative to parents’ income 
at the time of their own childhood years, it is family income rather than only father’s income 
that is considered.  Oppenheimer argued that there has been a change in the relative economic 
status of women, which have had consequences on wives’ economic contributions to their 
families, and that their incomes also must be counted. Oppenheimer suggests that the decline 
of male economic position relative to parents initiated a response of increasing female labour 
force participation as a compensation to increase income in the family which in turn led to 
young couples more easily reaching their preferred material life style. While this goes hand in 
hand with the Easterlin hypothesis, Oppenheimer argues that the following generation’s 
young adults had become more economically disadvantaged in comparison to their parents, 
and sacrifices in childbearing and marriage and an increase in wives’ labour force 
participation, became necessary to reach an affluent life-style. This pattern has continued, and 
each new cohort has had to increase wives’ labour force participation and reduce early 
fertility, which Oppenheimer argues is what has happened. Wives’ economic contribution in 
the family has thus increased by generation and become an important factor in the formation 
of a family.  
 
Oppenheimer’s contribution in the Easterlin hypothesis discussion has been large, and also 
made other scholars propose that a more accurate determinant of fertility behaviour would be 
to include females in the relative cohort size variable as to highlight how females also 
compete for jobs at young adult ages (Baird 1987) (Pampel 1993). Her contribution also 
spurred an inclusion of a female labour force participation variable among scholars, arguing 
that as wives’ participation in the labour force can compensate for low male incomes among 
large cohorts, the measure indicates women’s position in society and may have an impact on 
relative cohorts’ effect on fertility. As women’s position in society varies between countries, 
it is of extra importance in cross-country analyses (Pampel 1993).  
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Inclusion of the variable may however cause endogeneity bias due to the relationship between 
female labour force participation and fertility. Fertility decisions are highly possible to be 
determined in conjunction with the factors we argue to be the main determinants of fertility, 
such as female labour force participation. In other words, one factor may not cause the other, 
but rather be jointly determined. The problem with endogeneity bias in regressions is that the 
relations are hard to identify which makes them difficult to estimate, and inconsistent OLS-
estimators will remain a problem even if we can identify the relations (McNown 2000). Many 
researchers looking at fertility have nevertheless included the variable, and while some have 
been criticised for using it without providing any alternative regressions where the variable is 
excluded, others have aimed to lag the participation rate or used instrumental variable 
procedures (Pampel 1993) (Macunovich 1998). According to McNown (2000), these attempts 
to reduce the endogeneity bias do not go far enough, as he argues that “[t]he entire system of 
variables involved in aggregate fertility models is subject to rampant endogeneity”  due to 
them all being outcomes of interdependent decisions made by young couples (McNown 
2000:7). Hence, the complexity of endogeneity calls for caution when variables such as 
female labour force participation are included, but they may nevertheless prove important due 
to the structural changes of the roles of women in society.  
 
 
2.3. The Focus  
The two previous sections have discussed Easterlin’s hypothesis from his own perspective 
and presented previous literature that have aimed to validate the hypothesis. The large scope 
of the Easterlin hypothesis opens up for numerous different research possibilities. This calls 
for a clarification and closer look at the gaps in the already existing literature, as well as the 
major variables necessary.  
 
Easterlin clearly emphasised that immigration and business cycles affect the supply and 
demand for labour at entry levels, which is why he argued that relative cohort size increased 
in significance when the United States implemented policies that restricted immigration and 
maintained a growing level of employment. Many scholars have included the unemployment 
rate as a control variable to capture the impact of economic cycles, which highlights the 
variable’s importance. Migration, on the other hand, is indirectly controlled for in the most 
common way of measuring relative cohort size, and thus tends to have been excluded as a 
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separate variable in previous research. The relative cohort size measure work as a suitable 
proxy to relative income, and has been the key independent variable used by all cross-country 
studies as well as many single-country studies. In the majority of studies, the measure has 
followed Easterlin’s example, with a ratio of the old male adults aged 30- 64 to young male 
adults aged 15-29. The large debate of changing female roles in society has however spurred 
many authors to include females in the ratio, as their income play a larger role in total family 
income than previously acknowledged, and thus cannot be neglected to have an impact on 
relative income and fertility behaviour. Women’s changing roles have also spurred the debate 
of whether female labour force participation rate should be included as a variable or not. 
While Easterlin in the 1980s was eager to explain that the improvement of gender roles had 
not structurally changed the traditional family roles, it is today hard to neglect that female 
labour force participation is not solely an outcome of a deteriorating male relative income. 
That the trend has continued until today is a fact, but not much has been written or empirically 
tested of the Easterlin hypothesis during the last decade. A new look at the validity of the 
Easterlin hypothesis is in order not only to scrutinise the changing gender roles, but also to 
highlight years that have not yet been looked at. Including females in the relative cohort size 
measure would emphasise wives’ economic contribution in the family, while female labour 
force participation would control for differences in women’s contribution across countries. 
Because of the potential endogeneity bias, however, analysis of the Easterlin hypothesis ought 
to provide alternatives where female labour force participation is not included and possibly 
causing biased outcomes. Some of the more important variables highlighted in Macunovich’s 
review, but largely neglected by other scholars, are Pampel’s inclusion of variables that 
control for institutional differences. The varying degrees of social protection across countries, 
and the strong effect social benefits and protection policies may have on relative income 
levels and fertility behaviour make such control variables crucial in a cross-country analysis. 
 
An immediate distinction between my research and previous research on the Easterlin 
hypothesis is the measure of childbearing. Easterlin himself argued that in order to test the 
relative income hypothesis, the total fertility rate must be used as a dependent variable as it 
reflects changes in marital fertility as well as marriage behaviour. These changes, according to 
Easterlin, are dominated by the behaviour of women under thirty years of age, whose children 
born account for three quarters of all children. The total fertility rate in a year is in his book 
defined as “the total number of children that a hypothetical woman would have borne if she 
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had gone through her reproductive life having children at the average rate of childbearing 
actually prevailing in that year at each age from fifteen to forty-four” (Easterlin 1980:48). 
This definition has been imitated in most other studies of the Easterlin hypothesis. In fact, the 
conventional indicator of fertility in a year, used by the majority of scholars focusing on 
demographic issues, is the period total fertility rate (Potancokov , Sobotka, and Philipov 
2008). There are, however, some strong tempo-distortions that arise with the use of this 
measure, which have to be explained to justify the use of the new fertility measure. 
 
The period total fertility rate is affected by two components; the quantum component, which 
is the level of fertility, and the tempo component, which is the timing of childbirth. It is the 
tempo component that lately has become of interest due to the structural postponement of 
births in most European countries since the early 1970s, which has shifted the mean age of 
childbearing. The tempo effect distortion that arises with this postponement transition is that 
although the number of births over the life course remains constant, there will be a decline in 
the number of children born during the early womanhood years, hence depressing the period 
total fertility rate (Potancokov , Sobotka, and Philipov 2008). The risk for tempo-distortions 
were introduced by Ryder already in the late 1950s when he demonstrated that the 
discrepancy between the period total fertility rate and the cohort completed fertility rate 
depended in size upon how fast the mean age of childbearing was changing (Bongaarts and 
Sobotka 2012). First in proposing a method to measure the quantum of fertility in a year 
without including the tempo-effect discussed above was Bongaarts and Feeney in 1998, when 
they used the age of mother and birth order of child to better indicate the average number of 
births per woman, defining tempo distortions as “an inflation or deflation of the period TFR 
when the period (instead of the cohort) mean age at childbearing changes” (Bongaarts and 
Sobotka 2012:91). In 2012, Bongaarts and Sobotka highlighted the usefulness of a new 
variant of the measure introduced by Bongaarts and Feeney; tempo- and parity-adjusted total 
fertility rate, which provided more stable values by also controlling for the parity composition 
of the female population. They used it in a comparison to other total fertility measures to 
estimate the “role of declines in tempo and parity composition distortions in the recent rise in 
the conventional total fertility rate in Europe”, arguing that the period total fertility rate 
creates misinterpretations of the levels of fertility while the old tempo-adjusted total fertility 
rate is neither controlling for the parity distribution nor the instability from year to year 
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(Bongaarts and Sobotka 2012:84)
1
. The relatively new measure of total fertility rate has been 
included in the Human Fertility Database, making the measure easily accessible without 
complex calculations required by the researcher, thus allowing for more detailed analyses of 
fertility trends than before. That no other studies of the Easterlin hypothesis have yet included 
the measure of adjusted total fertility rate is hence not surprising, but the major setbacks with 
period total fertility nevertheless makes a focus on the adjusted total fertility rate necessary 
for more accuracy.  
 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Research Strategy and Design  
The previous section indicates that there is a strong need to narrow the scope of a study based 
upon the Easterlin hypothesis. The hypothesis ranges across decades and includes numerous 
interesting aspects, hence there is no surprise that both micro and macro studies have been 
carried out, as mentioned in the previous literature. While the main theoretical steps would be 
to examine either what impact birth cohort sizes have on relative income or what impact 
relative income has on fertility behaviour, the Easterlin hypothesis also touches on questions 
of how material aspirations are formed and how factors such as divorce, suicide and crime are 
affected by relative income and affect fertility behaviour. Qualitative research strategies could 
help us to achieve an in-depth understanding of some of these factors. However, a quantitative 
approach is more suitable in this case for a number of reasons. As an alternative to Becker’s 
neoclassical economic fertility model, the important role of the Easterlin hypothesis lies in 
whether it can be generalised to a large extent. With the new time period aimed to fill a gap in 
the literature on the hypothesis, this study has been limited to test the main point across time 
and nations, and a cross-country comparison of fertility behaviour over time requires the use 
of aggregated data. In line with other quantitative cross-country comparisons of the 
hypothesis, the study has used relative cohort size as a proxy for birth cohort as well as 
relative income in order to test the impact on fertility. 
                                                          
1 See Bongaarts and Sobotka’s article ”A Demographic Explanation for the Recent Rise in European 
Fertility” for a full explanation of how the tempo- and parity-adjusted total fertility rate is calculated. 
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The secondary data used are collected on a regular basis on samples of the population in a 
repeated cross sectional design. It is highly unlikely that the sample remains the same, as it 
would in a longitudinal study, and we therefore cannot fully address the direction of cause and 
effect. Aggregated data collected over a long period of time, however, makes it possible to 
chart change that can indicate causal relationships on country levels. Ideal in establishing a 
causal relationship would be to do an experimental design, but because of rare opportunities 
to do so, control variables are required in cross-country comparisons to account for 
differences across the countries studied that may affect the results (Bryman 2012). Before 
turning to the statistical approach of the study, the two following sections will present the 
variables of interest and the descriptive statistics of the data.    
 
3.2. Data 
The analysis covers five democratic welfare states between 1988 and 2008. The countries 
chosen are based upon Pampel’s study of the Easterlin hypothesis from 1993, where he chose 
18 industrial countries to compare the effect of relative cohort size on fertility. Limited data 
availability of the dependent fertility variable has been the main determinant of limiting the 
number of countries studied, and also affected the years of study. However, the main 
restriction to the years included has been the idea that the hypothesis should hold also when 
tested at time periods outside Easterlin’s scope. Country specific data of Finland, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United States have been collected from the United 
Nations World Population Prospects 2012, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, and the Human Fertility Database.  
While Easterlin hypothesised that relative cohort size could explain the levels of fertility 
within a country, there is a strong possibility that the relationship also holds across countries. 
Major differences between countries must therefore be controlled for, and allowing certain 
control variables to determine fertility by interacting countries with relative cohort sizes can 
help to identify the effect of the Easterlin hypothesis across countries. Internal validity bias is 
relatively limited but it should be acknowledged that the countries chosen are far from a 
representative sample of all industrialised countries in the world, and that other variables than 
the ones chosen may affect the relationship between cohort size and tempo-adjusted total 
fertility rate. Limited time resources in combination with a willingness to simplify have 
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determined the most crucial control variables based upon the Easterlin hypothesis and 
previous research on the topic. A big advantage with the official data sources used is that the 
data is relatively harmonised in order to ensure country-comparisons. Official sources often 
use country specific data that follow international guidelines, which specify how data are to 
be collected as well as how central concepts should be defined. The use of highly renowned 
databases also limits the risk that society will consider the data sources used in the research as 
unethical.    
The dependent variable is, contrary to most studies of the Easterlin Hypothesis using period 
total fertility rate, the tempo-adjusted total fertility rate. The rate indicates the average number 
of children per woman specified by birth order of the child and age of the mother. The data, 
because of its relatively new way of measuring fertility with reduced tempo-distortions, is 
rather limited but can be accessed through the Human Fertility Database. The database 
encourages researchers to use other indicators of fertility than the period total fertility rate, 
and uses officially registered births by calendar year, the age or cohort of the mother, and 
biological birth order in their indicators. The same measures have been used for all countries 
in order to produce uniform data. The data available at the Human Fertility Database is 
limited to countries with reliable population estimates ranging all reproductive ages and 
where there is complete birth registrations made by official statistical agencies. This is the 
main reason for the limitation to only five countries, but it also increases the reliability of the 
data.  
Relative cohort size has been used as a key independent variable, again following the example 
of Easterlin’s claim that relative cohort is a suitable proxy for both relative income and birth 
cohort. However, while Easterlin argued that relative cohort should be measured as the ratio 
of male population of 30-64 to 15-29, I have chosen to follow Oppenheimer’s (1976) 
argument of changing gender roles and wives’ increasing economic contribution to the family 
income, and therefore included the female population in the ratio used. Age-specific data have 
been derived from the UN World Population Prospects 2012 and merged to the correct age 
groups before calculating the ratio as population aged 30-64 divided by population aged 15-
29. A high ratio will display that the younger population is relatively small to the older 
population, thus symbolising a small cohort entering the labour market with relatively good 
opportunities of obtaining a high relative income. Again, the measure of population is rather 
accurate for the countries chosen because of their high standard of official registration. 
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However, for each country past trends of mortality and international migration is accounted 
for together with fertility, where international migration being the hardest to project. Lack of 
information of age-distribution of migrant flows have resulted in that the researchers at the 
United Nations World Population Prospect 2012 have used models based upon assumed 
migration flows to distribute the net number of migrants by age-group (United Nations 2014).  
Unemployment rate is included as a control variable for fluctuations in the labour market due 
to economic cycles. The variable is important for the Easterlin hypothesis’ basic idea that 
relative cohort size only became a significant variable in the United States after the Second 
World War when migration was limited and supply of jobs became relatively even, thus 
changing the supply and demand for young workers. While migration is accounted for in the 
measurement of relative cohort size, fluctuations in the labour market still need to be 
controlled for. Data on unemployment rates, measured as total unemployment for the working 
population aged 15 to 64, are derived from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development on labour statistics. Although argued to facilitate international comparisons, the 
national surveys on which the data are based may differ in sample and time aspects. 
Unemployment is measured slightly differently. Of the five countries, there are differences in 
the population included, ranging from pertaining to all registered in the country to only 
including private households. In the Swedish survey from 2005, also Swedish people 
employed abroad are included in the working population (OECD notes 2014). The values also 
vary from being based upon monthly, quarterly or semestrial estimates.  
The variables of social security spending and family allowance spending are based upon 
Pampel’s (1993) inclusion of numerous variables that accounted for differences in social 
institutions across countries. Although Pampel included both dynamic and stable variables in 
his regressions, and ranked the countries after the merged scores of each estimated variable in 
each country, I have chosen to include the two variables that are easily attainable and 
theoretically remain strong. Social security spending controls for country variations in public 
spending on benefits for social protection and reflect the commitment to redistribute resources 
with social purposes. Low-income households, elderly, sick, disabled, young, and 
unemployed citizens are usually targeted through these policies, which have the power to 
cushion poor conditions in the labour market for young adults. The data on public social 
security spending as a percentage of GDP is collected from the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, as is the data on public family allowance spending, also 
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measured as a percentage of GDP. Family allowance spending exclusively targets parents 
with children, thus differing from social security spending. Both variables reflect countries’ 
commitment to social protection for economically vulnerable young adults, and facilitate 
family formation and childbearing though financial support. The effects of relative cohort size 
on fertility are likely to be weaker in countries with strong commitment to social protection, 
and the variables are therefore included to control for cross-country differences. The variable 
would ideally measure social protection spending directed at young adults, as policies directed 
at the young are more likely to have an impact on fertility decisions among young couples, 
but because of the unavailability of information on how much is spent on the young, the social 
security spending variable rather remains a valuable indicator of nations’ commitment to 
social protection.  
The final variable is the much-debated female labour force participation rate included to 
acknowledge wives’ increased economic status and its likelihood to affect the relationship 
between relative cohort size and fertility. The data on female labour force participation is 
collected from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development on labour force 
statistics. It measures the annual female labour force participation rate as a percentage of the 
population, and concentrates on the ages between 15 and 29 in order to limit the ages to 
young adulthood years. As discussed in previous sections, the variable remains subject to 
endogeneity bias. The variable has been included in half of the regressions in order to reflect 
how the economic roles of women have changed across years and nations, and excluded in 
half of them to provide less biased estimates. 
 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics  
The following table presents summary statistics of the collected data: 
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The collected data has not been altered substantially, but rather presents the values derived 
from each variable’s data source. No outliers were detected. The relative cohort size, our key 
independent variable, ranges between 1.72 and 2.75. As the variable is measured as the 
population aged 30-64 divided by the population aged 15-29, our values indicate that at a 
minimum, the older population is 1.7 times more populous than the younger. The higher the 
ratio, the more populous is the older population to the younger, and the smaller is the relative 
cohort size of the young adults. In other words, a high ratio implies that the cohorts of young 
adult age are relatively small compared to if the ratio is low, and according to the Easterlin 
hypothesis we can assume that the small cohort have a high relative income. A closer look at 
the line diagram of the relative cohort size data below can show us further information of the 
change over time for the separate countries. For all countries, relative cohort size has 
increased between 1985 and 2008, 
however, it is possible to see slight 
fluctuations in which Sweden, Norway 
and the Netherlands had static or declining 
numbers during the first years of study 
and all countries tend to show declining or 
static numbers around the year of 2000.  
The unemployment rate has a large 
variation across countries and years, and 
varies between 1.62 and 16.53. The line 
diagram for unemployment rate shows a 
major increase during the financial crisis 
of the early 1990s, where Finland’s 
unemployment rate reaches above 16% of 
the working population. On an average, 
the unemployment rate over the years has 
fluctuated near 6% for all counties together.  
Female labour force participation has perhaps the largest variation with a standard deviation 
of 6.4 and ranging between 50.64 and 82.46 per cent of the female population. The diagram to 
the right shows us that the Netherlands on its own strongly contribute to lowering the average 
to just above 70.9%, but has remarkably increased its’ female labour force participation 
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between 1988 and 2008, indicating a 
strong change in women’s economic 
contribution to the family. Apart from the 
Netherlands, the other countries display 
relatively stagnant rates across the years. 
There is no strong indicator that the 
participation rates for young women have 
fluctuated since the 1980s in accordance with Easterlin’s hypothesis. 
The summary description also shows us the government spending on social security and 
family allowance as a percentage of GDP for the different countries. Social security spending 
as well as family allowance spending is on average the highest for Sweden and lowest for the 
United States, as the diagram below displays. As a minimum, the United States spent 12.8% 
of GDP on social security and 0.41% on family allowance, while Sweden at maximum 
reached 35.5% on social security spending and 4.8% on family allowance spending. The 
variation between the countries indicates different governmental commitment to social 
protection, and emphasises the importance of controlling for them in the regressions.  
  
Our dependent variable, the tempo-adjusted total fertility rate, is also interesting to take a 
closer look at. As the summary statistics shows us, it varies between 1.7 children per woman 
to 2.4 with relatively little variance as can be seen by the standard deviation for the variable. 
Although not included in the data, a line diagram of period total fertility rate has been 
constructed in order to display the differences between the two measures. As we can see, the 
period total fertility rate looks relatively similar to the tempo-adjusted total fertility rate in the 
overall shapes of the curves. However, the values vary and are on average higher for the 
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tempo-adjusted total fertility rate, while it also shows fluctuations in more detail. In spite of 
the tempo-adjusted total fertility rate for Sweden, the rates show only small fluctuations and 
remain stable during the 20-year period.   
Concerns for normal distribution of the residuals were tested through kernel density 
estimations, and the data deviate somewhat from the normal curve, especially the family 
allowance spending variable that reveals skewness but no heavy or light tails.  
 
3.4. Statistical Approach 
In order to analyse the secondary data, multivariate analysis has been used to include the 
crucial control variables as well as the changes in the relationship between adjusted total 
fertility rate and relative cohort size over time. The data is structured as balanced long panel 
data over cross sections and has been analysed using the software programme STATA12 for 
Windows.  
Regressions on panel data can capture variations over both country and time. As each time 
period of data is dependent on previous time periods, the standard errors need to be adjusted. 
This is not the case of cross-sections, and thus panel data is more complicated and requires 
estimation methods and models that are richer. Nevertheless, with the use of panel data that 
includes the variables of unemployment rate, female labour force participation rate, social 
security spending and family allowance spending, it is possible to control for country-specific 
effects that may be related to geographical, historical or political contexts. While there are 
many different linear models to be used for panel data, the pooled regressions and the fixed 
effects models are the ones emphasised in this paper. The fundamental distinction between 
different panel models are between fixed effects models and random effects models, where a 
random effects model assumes that the individual-specific effects are completely random and 
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thus uncorrelated with the regressors whereas a fixed effects model does not. The Hausman 
test has implied that the panel data of this study is more suitable for fixed effects than random 
effects models. Pooled regressions and fixed effects models can more accurately help to 
answer the main research question of this study.     
A pooled regression is similar to an Ordinary least squares (OLS) model, except that we add 
an extra dummy for each year. The effect of relative cohort size (RCS) on tempo-adjusted 
total fertility rate (TFR) can be specified in an econometric model by moving from model 
specification 1 to model specification 2 below. 
Model specification 1: 
                                                                            
In this first model, the tempo-adjusted total fertility rate in country i at time t equals the 
intercept plus the effects of the relative cohort size (RCS), unemployment rate, female labour 
force participation rate (flfp), social security spending (social), and family allowance spending 
(family) in country i at time t. Adding to this comes a whole range of other unobserved 
factors, some which are solely time dependent (Vt), some that are solely country dependent 
and do not vary with time (i), and some which are characteristic factors that vary both with 
time and country (uit). In the second model specification, the pooled OLS model, dummy 
variables have been created for each year, excluding the first year to avoid the dummy 
variable trap. For reasons of simplification, in this basic demonstration of the second model, 
the middle control variables and dummy variables have been excluded. 
Model specification 2: 
                                                     
The pooled OLS regression allows us to see how relative cohort size affects the tempo-
adjusted total fertility rate over time. It is however important to remember that the coefficients 
yield an overall measure rather than a separate one for each year. The actual error we see in 
our regression is thereby now including both the country dependent factors (i) and 
characteristic factors (it). What a pooled OLS regression does is lump all observations 
together and estimates them as if they had all belonged to the same country by creating a line 
of best fit. Thereby it also assumes that the regressors are exogenous and that the countries 
pooled are homogenous. The observations across different countries and across different 
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times are treated as if they were randomly sampled observations. The problem with this model 
is that for OLS estimates to be consistent it requires that the covariance of the error with the 
independent variables is equal to zero. Even if we control for certain independent variables in 
our model, this is likely not to be the case as there is a strong risk that the country dependent 
factors are correlated to the one or more of the independent variables. The covariance of the 
country specific factors with the independent variables will not be equal to zero, and the 
pooled regression estimates will be inconsistent.  
Because of this problem of country dependent factors, which we call unobserved 
heterogeneity, I will also use fixed effects models to estimate the relationship between relative 
cohort size and tempo-adjusted total fertility rate. In a fixed effects model, we calculate the 
time averaged equation of the pooled regression specification, and then subtract the time 
averaged equation from the original specification. As the country dependent variable (i) does 
not vary with time, the time averaged country dependent variable remains in its original form, 
and is thus removed from the equation when the time averaged equation is subtracted from the 
original specification. The unobserved heterogeneity will be removed and the regression will 
be consistent.  
Time averaged equation:                                                                     
Time averaged equation subtracted from original equation: 
                                                                                                           
Model specification 3:  
                                                  
The problem with a fixed effects model is that it removes anything that is time constant, and 
we thus cannot evaluate the effect of time-constant variables on the dependent variable.  
In one fixed effects model, I will also include interaction effects between each country and 
relative cohort size. By generating dummy variables for each country except the United 
States, which then becomes the reference category while we avoid the dummy trap, and then 
interacting each variable with relative cohort size, it is possible to differentiate how the effect 
of relative cohort size on fertility differs between the five countries.  
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Model specification 4:  
                                                             
                                                          
The analysis of the effect of relative cohort size on fertility is, for each model, carried out both 
with and without the female labour force participation rate variable. Including the variable is 
in one way necessary in order to recognise the mediating effects that it may have on the 
relative cohort size effects, but the potential endogeneity on the other hand makes it important 
to test regressions where the variable is excluded.  
Both pooled OLS regressions and fixed effects models will be used to analyse the relationship 
between relative cohort size and tempo-adjusted total fertility rate. Period effects have been 
controlled for through the use of year dummies. All independent variables have been lagged 
with one year to account for the fact that birth does not occur until approximately a year after 
fertility decisions, which are likely to be strongly affected by the conditions we are controlling 
for in the independent variables.  The concern of reliability, that the results found are 
repeatable and the measures consistent, is tested with the use of Cronbach’s alpha test. All 
estimates will also be considered in relation to the related significance level. The significance 
level, which is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis given that it is true, must be 
higher than the p-value, which is the probability of random chance to explain the result, for a 
coefficient to be statistically significant. A p-value of 0.05 thus indicates that there are only 
5% probability that the results are due to chance, and thus 95% probability that the results are 
not due to chance (Cameron and Trivedi 2009). Significance levels of 0.05 and 0.01 have 
been used in this study to indicate whether the coefficients are statistically significant or not.  
 
4. Analysis 
4.1. Results Pooled Regression  
Two models, one with and one without the female labour force participation rate variable 
(FLFP), were tested through pooled OLS regressions of the five countries between 1988 and 
2008 (see Table 1). The R
2
, which measures how close the observed data are to the fitted 
regression line, is 74.3% in the FLFP-model and 55.9% in the model without, indicating that 
the FLFP-model better explains the variation of data. However, there is a risk that the R
2
 can 
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be misleading, as it cannot determine if estimates and predictions are subject to bias. A closer 
look at the residual plots helped to confirm that the models fit the data relatively well, with 
randomly dispersed residual plots around each variable’s horizontal axis. Multicollinearity 
among the independent variables in the models was also tested for, by using the Variance 
Inflation Factor (vif) command. While values over 10 indicate strong multicollinearity, the 
highest value was 7.64 for family allowance spending in the model including female labour 
force participation rate as a variable. The models have been adjusted for heteroskedaticity 
with the robust command, as variance that is spread unequally makes the estimators 
inefficient and may lead to an overestimation of t- and f-statistics.  
Note: Level of significance, * = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01  
Analysis of the pooled data shows that the relationship between relative cohort size and 
tempo-adjusted total fertility rate is significant but negative for the five countries between 
1988 and 2008, both with and without controlling for female labour force participation. 
According to the Easterlin hypothesis, relatively smaller cohorts tend to, because of their 
higher relative income, have a higher fertility rate. The relative cohort size variable in the 
dataset is measured so that the higher the value is, the smaller the cohort is. According to the 
Easterlin hypothesis, we would thus expect that an increase in the relative cohort size variable 
would have a positive effect on tempo-adjusted total fertility rate. However, the results from 
the pooled regressions show that for each additional unit increase in the relative cohort size 
variable, the tempo-adjusted total fertility rate decreases - with 0.563 children when female 
labour force participation is controlled for, and 0.570 children when it is not. Both coefficients 
were highly significant at the 0.01 level.  
Table 1: Pooled OLS regression 
 FLFP included FLFP not included 
Measure coeff (β) Standard 
Error 
coeff (β) Standard 
Error 
Relative cohort size -0.563** 0.069 -0.570** 0.074 
Unemployment rate 0.011* 0.005 -0.000 0.006 
Social security spending -0.010* 0.004 -0.022** 0.005 
Family allowance spending 0.002 0.021 0.115** 0.022 
Female labour force participation rate 0.019** 0.003   
Constant 1.915** 0.225 3.223** 0.150 
R2 0.743  0.559  
 26 
Although the control variables are of little importance when it comes to interpreting the data, 
the big variation in family allowance spending between the two models requires a comment
2
. 
The model including female labour force participation rate had a coefficient of 0.002 and a 
non-significant p-value as high as 0.90, while the model without the variable had a coefficient 
of 0.118 and was significant to the 0.01 level. We do, however, have to remember that all 
control variables are crucial to control for differences between countries, and the effect we see 
lumps all countries together, and thus averages the experiences. As discussed previously, the 
relationship in the pooled OLS model may therefore be affected by heterogeneity between 
countries. We turn to the fixed effects models in the following sub-section to look at countries 
individually.  
 
4.2. Results Fixed Effects 
Note: Level of significance, * = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01  
Table 2 shows fixed effects models, with and without female labour force participation rate 
(FLFP) included as a variable. In these models, the unobserved heterogeneity has been 
removed in the specification, making the regressions more consistent than the pooled OLS 
regressions. Country dependent factors previously included in the error term have thus been 
removed. The models were adjusted for heteroskedaticity and autocorrelation through the 
vce(cluster country) command.  
                                                          
2 As the main research question of this study is looking at the effect of relative cohort size on fertility, the control 
variables have been not interpreted in the results sections. They are included in the regressions to control for 
differences between countries, but their own effects on fertility in each country are not of interest to this study.   
Table 2: Fixed Effects Model 
 FLFP included FLFP not included 
Measure coeff (β) Standard 
Error 
coeff (β) Standard 
Error 
Relative cohort size -0.460* 0.127 -0.267 0.114 
Unemployment rate 0.002 0.017 -0.006 0.012 
Social security spending 0.001 0.010 -0.003 0.010 
Family allowance spending 0.150 0.081 0.193 0.071 
Female labour force participation rate 0.013 0.009   
Constant 1.529* 0.515 2.141** 0.260 
R2 0.650  0.632  
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In the fixed effect model including female labour force participation rate, we can see that the 
relative cohort size variable remains negative with on average 0.46 less children per unit 
increase in the relative cohort size variable. This value is less negative than the relative cohort 
size value in the pooled OLS regression, but significant only to the 0.05 instead of the 0.01 
level. For the model without female labour force participation included, the negative value is 
even smaller, but has become insignificant. While the constant for both models are significant 
to the 0.05 level, the all of the independent variables apart from relative cohort size are non-
significant. The R
2
s have converged to 0.650 and 0.632 from previous 0.743 and 0.559. For 
both the pooled regressions and fixed effects models, a more negative effect of relative cohort 
size on fertility seems to be more statistically significant. 
Note: Level of significance, * = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01  
Including interactions between each dummy variable for country and the relative cohort size 
variable allows the effect to vary between countries, displayed by Table 3. The models make 
it possible to see if the relationship between relative cohort size and tempo-adjusted total 
fertility rate is different depending on which country we look at. Table 3 shows us that the R
2
 
has strongly increased for both models, while the relative cohort size effects have changed 
further. The interaction effects have to be interpreted in relation to a reference country, which 
in this study was chosen to be the United States as it was the country where Easterlin himself 
Table 3: Fixed Effects Model with Country and Cohort Interaction 
 FLFP included FLFP not included 
Measure coeff (β) Standard 
Error 
coeff (β) Standard 
Error 
Relative cohort size for the United States 0.523 0.297 0.676 0.384 
Unemployment rate 0.012 0.008 -0.005 0.009 
Social security spending -0.009 0.006 -0.006 0.011 
Family allowance spending 0.140 0.056 0.146 0.069 
Female labour force participation rate 0.033 0.016   
Interaction Finland -0.249 0.235 -0.262 0.214 
Interaction Netherlands -1.074* 0.266 -0.717 0.261 
Interaction Norway -0.826** 0.136 -0.741** 0.157 
Interaction Sweden -0.400 0.375 -0.763* 0.243 
Constant -0.485 1.323 1.461 0.580 
R2 0.803  0.766  
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carried out his visual study. Table 3 shows us that if the coefficients are correctly estimated, 
the relative cohort size effect is positive for the United States while all country interaction 
effects are negative.  The calculation of relative cohort size effect for the European countries 
will be explained below, and an analysis of the results will follow in the upcoming discussion 
section.  
In the model where female labour force participation is included, the relative cohort size 
effect for the United States is 0.523. For each unit increase of the relative cohort size variable, 
the tempo-adjusted total fertility rate increases with 0.523 children. Table 4 helps us to 
structure the following values for each country. In Finland, this effect is 0.249 children less 
than in the United States; 0.274 children in total. The Netherlands has the largest negative 
value of 1.074 children less than in the United States – in total decreasing the tempo-adjusted 
total fertility rate with 0.551 children for 
each unit increase in the relative cohort 
size variable. Norway also has a large 
negative interaction effect of 0.826 
children less than in the United States, 
resulting in a decreasing tempo-adjusted 
total fertility rate coefficient of 0.303. 
Lastly, the interaction effect for Sweden is 
0.4 less than United States, and manages 
to keep a small but positive coefficient of 
0.123 increase in the fertility rate for each 
additional unit of relative cohort size. 
As previously explained, an increase in the relative cohort size variable symbolise a decrease 
in the cohort size of young workers relative to old workers. According to the Easterlin 
hypothesis, an increase in the relative cohort size variable is expected to result in a higher 
tempo-adjusted total fertility rate. A positive coefficient, which is in line with the hypothesis, 
is seen for the United States, Finland, and Sweden. On the other hand, the only statistically 
significant coefficients are for the Netherlands and Norway, who show negative relative 
cohort size effects. 
 
Table 4: FLFP included 
Country Interaction 
coeff (β) 
Relative cohort 
size effect 
United States 0 (ref.) 0.523 
Finland -0.249 0.274 
Netherlands -1.074* -0.551 
Norway -0.826** -0.303 
Sweden -0.400 0.123 
Note: Relative cohort size effect calculated by the base 
effect of the reference country minus the interaction 
effect coefficient. 
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In the model where the female labour 
force participation rate is not included, the 
effect of relative cohort size on tempo-
adjusted total fertility rate is higher for the 
United States than in the previous model, 
reaching an average of 0.676 children. 
Once again, all European countries have 
negative interaction effects, but in this 
model only Finland, with an interaction 
effect of 0.262 lower than the United 
States, manages to keep a positive effect of relative cohort size on tempo-adjusted total 
fertility rate. The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, on the other hand, all show negative 
relative cohort size effects. The negative effects they display, 0.041 for the Netherlands, 0.065 
for Norway and 0.087 for Sweden, are less negative than in the model where the female 
labour force participation rate variable was included. However, Sweden has shifted from 
being positive and statistically insignificant, to the most negative effect and statistically 
significant. While the Netherlands have lost its significance, Norway keeps being negative 
and significant to a 0.01 level.  
As with the previous models, the more negative effects tend to be more statistically 
significant.  
 
4.3. Discussion  
The Easterlin hypothesis argues that the size of a birth cohort has a significant impact on 
fertility behaviour. In comparison to small cohorts, large cohorts are faced with unfavourable 
economic conditions due to a harsher competition for entry-level jobs and career 
opportunities. They will have a harder time in achieving their material aspirations created 
during their childhood years, and will experience pressure to postpone childbearing until their 
aspirations are met. Young wives will increasingly participate in the labour force to contribute 
to the insufficient income of the husbands, further postponing childbearing. Large cohorts will 
thus give birth to small cohorts, who will not only grow up in scarcity with opposite 
conditions and outcomes, but who will also have lower relative material aspirations due to 
Table 5: FLFP not included 
Country Interaction 
coeff (β) 
Relative cohort 
size effect 
United States 0 (ref.) 0.676 
Finland -0.262 0.414 
Netherlands -0.717 -0.041 
Norway -0.741** -0.065 
Sweden -0.763* -0.087 
Note: Relative cohort size effect calculated by the base 
effect of the reference country minus the interaction 
effect coefficient. 
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their parents’ unfavourable economic situation. A self-generating circle of approximately 40 
years, with large cohorts giving birth to small cohorts and vice versa, is what Easterlin argued 
to have started after the Second World War when the U.S. government policy stabilised the 
demand for and restricted the supply of labour.   
The above-simplified repetition of the Easterlin hypothesis is crucial to remind us of how the 
relationship between relative cohort size and fertility according to Easterlin has created a self-
generating cycle. In order to analyse whether the Easterlin hypothesis hold across countries 
and time, this research has aimed to be precise with Easterlin’s main points, while walking in 
the footsteps of previous literature on the hypothesis. In order to avoid the critique pointed at 
unsupportive scholars such as Ermisch, this study has been careful to use the measurement of 
relative cohort size as specified by Easterlin. According to the hypothesis, we would therefore 
expect a positive effect of relative cohort size on fertility, indicating that the smaller the size 
of the cohort, the higher the rate of fertility.  
However, if we return to the results of the pooled regressions, fixed effects models, and 
interactions, we do find them unsupportive of the Easterlin hypothesis. Both pooled 
regressions, which in an ideal world of the Easterlin hypothesis would show a positive effect 
of relative cohort size on fertility across industrialised nations, instead display statistically 
significant negative results. In the more consistent fixed effects models, the results continue to 
be negative, but only the model including the female labour force rate variable remains 
statistically significant. The fixed effects model including interactions between relative cohort 
size and countries makes it possible to analyse the effect within each country, and contains the 
results of most interest for this study. If we assume that the coefficients are correctly 
estimated, the results vary, both across nations, and depending on whether we include the 
possibly endogenous female labour force participation rate variable or not. If we do, we find a 
positive effect for the reference country the United States, and negative interaction effects of 
the European countries. When the interaction effects are deducted from the relative cohort 
size effect of the United States, Finland and Sweden show small positive effects of relative 
cohort size on fertility, while the Netherlands and Norway display negative effects. In the 
model where the possibly endogenous female labour force participation variable is excluded, 
the positive effect of the United States is larger, but only Finland remains with a positive 
effect among the European countries. These results are in line with previous findings by other 
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scholars - the Unites States tend to show a positive effect, while European countries instead 
tend to show negative ones.  
However, the results from the interaction models call for a closer look at the statistical 
significance of the estimates. In fact, only the interaction effects for the Netherlands and 
Norway are statistically significant in the model where female labour force participation is 
included, and in similar fashion, it is only Norway and Sweden that remain statistically 
significant in the model where female labour force participation is not. In both models, it is 
the more negative interaction effects that are statistically significant. The fact that the United 
States is statistically insignificant while it is the reference country makes interpretations of the 
interaction effects more difficult. For both models, there is a 15,3% risk that the observed 
relative cohort size coefficients for the United States have arisen purely by chance. Although 
this is a high risk that is far from accepted in econometric modelling, the risks are even 
greater for the European countries that, if assumed correct, are showing positive results. 
Finland and Sweden show risks of above 34% in the model where female labour force 
participation is included. In the model where the participation rate is not included, Finland 
alone shows a risk of above 27%. The other European countries, which show negative effects 
of relative cohort size on fertility, in both models, show risks of less than 6%. The statistical 
significance indicates that the positive effects of relative cohort size on fertility are more 
likely to be wrongly estimated than the negative effects. Therefore, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that the positive effects, to a great extent, risk being negative.  
This discussion of statistical significance has to be put in relation to scientific, or economic, 
significance. A dominant scholar on the scientific significance literature is McClosky (2009), 
who strongly argues that statistical significance is far from sufficient to prove results to be 
relevant in practice. If we return to the results of this study, we thus have to acknowledge the 
change of cohort size required for a scientific effect to occur. One unit increase in the relative 
cohort size variable symbolises a doubling of the population aged 30-64 compared to the 
population aged 15-29. In other words, the whole size of the younger population would have 
to increase in the older population for the relative cohort size variable to increase with only 
one unit. The one unit change thus resembles an immense decrease of the young cohort size to 
the older, and it would require a very small relative cohort size in comparison to the older in 
order to see any real difference in fertility levels. The largest negative relative cohort size 
statistically significant effect we see, -0.551 for the Netherlands in the model where female 
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labour force participation rate is included, becomes scientifically insignificant when 
interpreted as a decrease of the average number of children per woman by approximately half 
a child, for each doubling of the older population to the younger. For a real change in fertility 
levels to occur, a not yet observed change in the relative cohort size would be required. 
Hence, the results can be considered scientifically insignificant. Interestingly, when previous 
literature on the Easterlin hypothesis is examined from the same perspective of scientific 
significance, their results, are faced with the same dilemma of scientific insignificance.  
The results from the pooled regressions, fixed effects models, and interaction effects indicate 
that there is no strong support of the Easterlin hypothesis between the time period of 1988 and 
2008. The findings contradict the Easterlin hypothesis, as well as the majority of scholars who 
have tested it. If we assume that the unsupportive results found between 1988 and 2008 are 
correct, the major question that arises is why these results differ from the period studied by 
Easterlin. To answer this question, the lack of relationship in the later period has to be put in 
the context of the earlier periods following the baby boom after the Second World War.  
The relationship between relative cohort size and fertility as examined by the majority of 
scholars unambiguously includes the post-war era, as the graph from Pampel’s study in 1993 
displays below. 
Note: Graph taken from Fred C. Pampel’s article “Relative Cohort Size and Fertility: The Socio-Political 
Context of the Easterlin Effect” from 1993. 
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The relationship is visually apparent from the 1950s. In the late 1950s, the relative cohort size 
variable is declining as the baby boom generation of the post-war era is entering the labour 
market. We also see a decline in total fertility rate. However, when the relative cohort size 
variable starts to increase again in the 1980s, there is no indicator that the total fertility rate 
does the same. Instead, the fertility rate stays relatively stagnant after the 1980s, which is 
confirmed by the line diagrams of both tempo-adjusted and period fertility rates in the 
descriptive statistics, which, apart from Sweden, show no trend in fluctuations after the 1980s. 
Revolutionary for this study is that it examines the hypothesis beginning from the 1980s and 
thus excludes the time period where the Easterlin hypothesis can be visually supported. 
Instead, I argue that if the Easterlin hypothesis is to be supported, it has to hold across any 
time period. There are a few alternatives to why the effect of relative cohort size on fertility 
appears positive pre-1980s and insignificant post-1980s. Firstly, the relationship during the 
early period may have been causal, but dissolved during the later period. Secondly, there may 
never have been a causal relationship, and the relationship observed by Easterlin and other 
scholars during the early period were rather spurious, with separate processes that caused the 
variables to decline simultaneously.   
If we turn to the first alternative, it can be argued that a causal relationship existed during the 
time period Easterlin and other scholars observed, but has seized to exist at later time periods. 
In other words, if there indeed was a self-generating mechanism created by the conditions of 
post-world war America, it has decreased in significance on both a statistical and scientific 
level. Extensive literature has tried to explain the decrease in fertility and why fertility has 
remained low post 1980s. Rather than arguing that fertility responds in a linear way to a 
change in the relative cohort size variable, it can be argued that when fertility reaches a 
certain level or conditions change, fertility can start to behave in a non-linear way. There is a 
consensus in the literature that once fertility reaches low levels, a so called “trap” may occur 
where it will be difficult to increase fertility levels again. The change in the demographic 
regime from high to low fertility levels may create a self-reinforcing process that keeps 
fertility low, and challenges Easterlin’s idea that fertility will increase when small cohort sizes 
enter young adult age. However, Lutz, Skirbekk and Testa (2006) include Easterlin’s ideas of 
material aspirations as one out of three possible mechanisms that constitute this self-
reinforcing low fertility trap (appendix 1). 
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The first mechanism is demographic and reflects how the number of births (together with 
mortality and migration) influences the age-structure of the population, which later affects the 
number of births from the period fertility. The number of births, or crude birth rate if we 
divide it by the population, is a function of the age-structure in combination and past period 
fertility, with the latter affected by cohort fertility and the timing of fertility discussed earlier 
as a reason for using tempo-adjusted total fertility rate, rather than period total fertility rate as 
a measure for fertility. Cohort size, in turn, is affected by social norms such as how many 
children constitute an ideal family size (Lutz, Skirbekk and Testa 2006). These social norms 
make up the second mechanism; the sociological one, which is assumed to affect cohort 
fertility. The low fertility trap hypothesis claims that declines in actual fertility have affected 
the ideal family size through a change in social norms. Young couples especially are 
influenced by the experience around them, which has seen a decline in the number of children 
(ibid). The low fertility trap hypothesis emphasises the family situation of couples only 
slightly older as having a stronger influence, as opposed to couple’s parents’ past economic 
situation, which was argued by Easterlin. The economic rationale is thus the third mechanism 
included in the low-fertility trap hypothesis, and is directly drawn from Easterlin’s idea of 
couples’ income relative to material aspirations formed during childhood years affecting the 
timing of family formation. An increasing mean age of childbearing is an effect of these 
social and economic factors combined, which is a reason for why tempo-adjusted total 
fertility rate had to be used in this study.  
Lutz, Skirbekk and Testa (2006) argue that while material aspirations have continued to 
increase, opinion surveys have documented that young people are faced with an increasingly 
pessimistic economic outlook. An ageing population force changes in nations’ social security 
systems, where young generations are more negatively affected by the necessary cuts than 
older generations who experience more gradual cuts. In addition, they argue that “rapid 
population ageing may also result in lower productivity and consequently in a globalised 
economy, less investment and lower economic growth in the future”, which, together with 
deterioration of benefits for younger generations, trigger a negative perception of their 
economic status (Lutz et al 2006:14). This argument can also be strengthened through looking 
closer at female labour force participation as argued by Oppenheimer (1976), which indicated 
a trend in participation, which perhaps to a start followed Easterlin’s theory, but in today’s 
standards have come to symbolise a structural change. As explained in the theoretical 
framework of this paper, Oppenheimer argued for a change that we can refer to as a female 
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labour force participation trap - in which the increase of participation of one generation 
creates a higher threshold for the following generation in order to reach their material 
aspirations, and further participation of wives will be necessary to reach the life style seen as a 
pre-requisite for family formation. With increasing participation, a change in the economic 
contribution of wives within the family has also improved. Such a change is likely to have 
helped the transformation of fertility behaviour in combination with other factors such as the 
low fertility trap, which together may have dissolved the assumptions of the self-generating 
mechanism as argued by Easterlin.   
The second alternative is that the relationship observed by Easterlin and many of his followers 
between the 1950s and 1980s, in fact was spurious. The decline in fertility and the decline in 
the relative cohort size variable may have been caused by separate processes that cause the 
curves to follow similar patterns. As the relative cohort size variable is measured as a ratio of 
older to younger workers, time will cause the variable to fluctuate. The fertility variable, 
however, will not automatically fluctuate due to its measurement. The fertility variable thus 
has to be put in a larger context over a greater time period.  
The graph below by Lee (2003) shows how fertility has decreased since the 1950s and is 
projected to decrease for different groups of countries.  
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While we see a more rapid decrease among less and least developed countries, the decrease is 
also present for more developed countries - where the five countries of this study are 
included. More importantly, we see a general decrease in fertility for all countries, and not 
only welfare states
3
. Fluctuations in fertility levels are not visible, and the strong decline in 
fertility since the post-war period indicates a trend on a global level that is not dependent on 
cohort size fluctuations. The structural decline in fertility is defined by Lee (2003) and other 
scholars as the second demographic transition - where more developed countries experience 
beyond replacement levels of fertility, while less and least developed countries encounter 
substantial declines in the number of children born per woman. Other scholars argue that the 
second demographic transition is merely a continuation of the first one, which for developed 
countries already started in the beginning of the 19
th
 century with declining mortality (Lee 
2003). The drop in fertility during the period studied by Easterlin may simply have been a 
continuation of the fertility decline argued to have been caused by modernisation and 
resulting in the second demographic transition when fertility reached very low levels in many 
more developed countries. As Becker argued in his fertility theory, modernisation caused 
children to become more costly in comparison to consumption goods. Put in a historical 
context, technological advancement in combination with physical and human capital 
increased the productivity of labour, and thus the value of time (Galor and Weil 1996). Lee 
(2003:174) links the above argument to the development until today; “Rising incomes have 
shifted consumption demand toward nonagricultural goods and services, for which educated 
labor is a more important input. A rise in the return to education then leads to increased 
investments in education. Overall, these patterns have several effects: children become more 
expensive, their economic contributions are diminished by school time and educated parents 
have higher value of time, which raises the opportunity costs of childrearing”.  
Thus, the decline in fertility between the 1950s and 1980s may have been caused by factors 
related to modernisation and the demographic transition, rather than caused by an increasingly 
large cohort size entering the labour market in bad economic conditions. The lack of 
relationship between the variables post 1980 indicates that there is a likelihood that the 
decline in the relative cohort size variable in earlier studies just happened to occur at the same 
time as a structural decline in fertility, and the correlated events may have been mistaken for a 
causal relationship. With no other study confirming a continuation of the self-generating cycle 
                                                          
3 The majority of researchers studying the Easterlin hypothesis have focused on industrial (i.e. more 
developed) countries.  
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predicted by Easterlin, where the relationship with fertility also continues when the relative 
cohort size variable is increasing, the results of this study from 1988 to 2008 indicates that the 
Easterlin hypothesis is based entirely upon a specific period in time and cannot be generalised 
as a continuous phenomena
4
.  
 
5. Summary conclusion 
Easterlin’s hypothesis of relative income has had a major impact on the literature of fertility 
behaviour. By suggesting that relative cohort size has an impact on relative income, which 
will play a strong role in fertility behaviour, Easterlin’s hypothesis would be able to predict 
future labour market outcomes, as well as fertility outcomes. The large potential contribution 
spurred numerous scholars to test the Easterlin hypothesis, the majority of them confirming 
the relationship between relative cohort size and fertility. Nevertheless, the results from this 
study contradict the results from previous research.  
In an exploratory country-comparative research, five industrialised countries have been 
examined between the years of 1988 and 2008 in order to investigate the effect of relative 
cohort size on fertility, in a later period than Easterlin and his followers. First, this paper has 
shown that the effect of relative cohort size on fertility differs between the countries studied, 
but due to both statistical and scientific insignificance, the effects can be disregarded. Thus, 
the Easterlin hypothesis cannot be supported. Second, the time period of 1988 to 2008 shows 
different results from supportive studies of earlier time periods. However, while contradicting 
results would show a clear negative instead of positive effect, the results of the latter time 
period indicate no significant effect at all. Third, and last, this paper has attempted to explain 
possible reasons to the difference in results between the two time periods. Put in relation to 
previous findings of the post-war period, it has discussed two major alternatives to the limited 
support of the more recent time period. The first one argues that even if relative cohort size 
strongly contributed to fertility behaviour when the baby boom generation in the United States 
entered the labour market in a harsh economic environment and thus experienced pressure to 
put off having children, the relationship has ceased to exist. While it is likely that relative 
                                                          
4 The visual increase in fertility from 1949 to 1957 in Pampel’s graph shows the post-war baby boom. 
Improved conditions after the war facilitated family formation that had been surpressed during the 
war.  
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income still matters, young couples may postpone family formation due to an increasing 
importance of women to participate in the labour force in order for the couples to meet their 
material aspirations. Also, to have fewer children later has become more socially acceptable, 
which is argued to have created a low-fertility trap. The second alternative instead argues that 
the causal relationship between relative cohort size and fertility may never have existed. The 
relationship observed by Easterlin and many other scholars is likely to have been supportive 
of the relationship only because of the unique time period they examined, but instead of the 
relationship being causal, it may have been spurious. While relative cohort size will fluctuate 
with time, fertility tends to have decreased substantially between the 1950s and 1980s, but 
then remained low until today. The decrease in fertility during this time period may very well 
be a consequence of modernisation, which happened to take place at the same time as the 
post-war baby boom generation started to enter the labour market. Thus, there are no 
significant indicators that the drop in fertility was a consequence of the relative cohort size. In 
either case, Easterlin’s hypothesis of a self-generating mechanism has failed to occur. The fact 
that the Easterlin hypothesis is failing to reflect the fertility behaviour of today indicates an 
insignificant influence of relative cohort size to shape life outcomes. To predict labour market 
outcomes and fertility behaviour based upon the size of a cohort is therefore not to be 
recommended. 
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7. Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: The Low-Fertility Trap Hypothesis by Lutz, Shirbekk and Trak (2006).  
LFT-1 is the demographic mechanism. LFT-2 is the sociological mechanism, and LFT-3 is 
the economic mechanism derived from the Easterlin hypothesis. 
 
 
